10 Financial Predictions for the Next 10 Years

Yogi Berra famously said, “It is tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” We strongly concur. Yet “expert forecasters” continue to make economic and market prognostications about the coming year despite the fact that human experts are worse than rats at such predictions and that these experts have demonstrated zero success in forecasting the stock market or the economy. And we continue giving them the stage to do so because human braves are wired to detest the chaos of an uncertain future. Even if prognostications do not provide any clarity at all, they satisfy our brains with the false perception of clarity. Our brains are wired to what behavioral economist Jason Zweig labels “the prediction addiction”.

To quell the itch for 2021 market predictions, I offer two of my annual favorites from authors Barry Rithlotz and Jonathan Clements. Their predictions about the upcoming year are likely to be more accurate than 99% of the alternative forecasts. Moreover, we offer below our 10 financial predictions about the next decade. Making predictions about the next 10 years is admittedly far less exciting or glamorous than predicting what sectors will outperform in 2021 or what stocks to buy in 2021 but it is a far more reasonable undertaking. And – speaking from a point of sincere humility – it will require more time to be proven wrong.

1) Value stocks will outperform growth stocks by at least 1.5% annually.

Between 1926 and the end of 2019, US value stocks outpaced their growth stock kin by an average of 4.4% per calendar year. However, the past decade has witnessed a sharp disconnect from this tendency with growth stocks besting value stocks in 6 of the prior 7 years. Growth stocks have become – as a result – dramatically more expensive relative to value stocks than at any point in history – including the historic dot-com boom of the late 1990’s. As we explained in this recent post, the single most important phenomenon in the stock market right now is this unprecedented value/growth relationship that sets up very well for value stocks going forward.

Measurement: Russell 1000 Value Index vs. Russell 1000 Growth Index 

2) Developed foreign stocks will outperform US stocks by at least 1% annually.

The case for this forecast is driven by the dramatic valuation gap between foreign stocks and domestic stocks. US stocks, in aggregate, are expensive by nearly every valuation metric whereas foreign stocks offer much more attractive valuations. If the relationship between the two reverts towards historic averages, we would expect foreign stocks to outperform US stocks by 2%-6% per year over the coming decade.

Measurement: MSCI EAFE Index vs. S&P 500 Index

3) Emerging market stocks will outperform US stocks by at least 1% annually.

There is a compelling case to be made for emerging markets over the next 25 years based strictly on demographics with a faster growing and younger population to counter the developed world’s graying population. Demographics have historically played an important role in stock market returns over extended time periods. However, we can ignore the demographics case and focus strictly on the valuations where depressed emerging market valuations set the stage for outsized returns over the coming decade.

Measurement: MSCI Emerging Markets Index vs. S&P 500 Index

4) US stocks earn a nominal return of less than 6.0% per year

Many long-term forecasts for the US stock market that use a quantitative framework would look at 6.0% per year over the next ten years as extremely optimistic. Morningstar calculates an expected annual return of 1.7%. Research Affiliates estimates a 0.3% annual real return while Vanguard estimates a nominal range of 3.5% – 5.5%. The foreboding problem for US stocks is they they are extremely expensive based on almost every measurement. Using the popular price/earnings ratio, the S&P 500 is more than double its historic average. Using a better predictive measure – the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio – US stocks trade at nearly 2.3 standard deviations above their long term mean. 

Even if US stocks don’t revert to historic averages but just maintain these rich levels for the next 10 years, the case for returns approaching 6% per year would depend largely on inflation running at 4% or more over that stretch – definitely not something that retirees should be hoping for.

Measurement: S&P 500 annualized total return

Forecasted return is based on a linear regression of S&P 500 Index cyclically adjusted price/earnings (CAPE) ratio and S&P 500 Index 10-year forward return starting in January 1926 and running through November 2020.

5) US bonds earn a nominal return of less than 2.0% per year

The 10-year Treasury yield dropped below 1.0% in March 2020 and has not eclipsed that level since. Although non-government high grade bonds (corporates, mortgage backed securities, etc.) may have higher yields, the expected long-term return for such bonds tends to converge closer to Treasuries as downgrades, defaults, and other credit events impact long-term results. As a result (and as evidenced by the chart below), the current 10-year Treasury yield provides an extremely useful way to forecast the 10-year forward return for bonds. Based on current yields and the mathematical ceiling imposed on bond returns by these yields, it is hard to envision a scenario (aside from the one where interest rates went sharply negative) where the total annualized return for US bonds exceeds 1.5% – 2.0% over the next decade.

Measurement: Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate Bond Index Total Annualized Return

6) Cash produces a negative real return

The Federal Reserve has publicized its playbook: an expectation to keep short-term interest rates near zero through at least 2023 and the scrapping of historic policy to promptly raise rates in response to a drop in unemployment levels. As long as the Fed sticks to this recently outlined playbook, it seems apparent that at least the first half of the next decade will provide a poor environment for cash and a decline in purchasing power. This result would simply continue a consistent trend as 1-Month US Treasury Bills – a proxy for cash returns – have lost money to inflation every calendar year since 2009. 

Measurement: 30-Day T-Bills vs. Consumer Price Index

7) Social Security taxes are significantly expanded to include income above the current limits.

The most recent Social Security Trustees’ Report estimates that the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance trust fund reserves will be depleted in 2035 and that just three-quarters of the scheduled benefits will be available from Social Security tax income after such time. With the clock inching closer to this deadline and confidence in Social Security’s health waning, policymakers will have to address the impending shortfall over the next decade. Although there are several possible solutions that could be part of the fix including an increased retirement age or changes to the annual cost of living adjustments, the most politically feasible solutions based on public sentiment would be on the revenue side rather than any changes to the benefits equation. It seems likely based on this sentiment and political discourse that a broad expansion or outright elimination of the cap on Social Security earnings ($142,800 in 2021) is in store at some point over the next decade.

Measurement: Social Security wage base limit > $300,000 by the end of 2030       

8) The Backdoor Roth contribution loophole is closed

In February 2016, I outlined three financial planning strategies that were likely to end up on the chopping blocks over the coming years. One of those items – the “stretch IRA” – effectively died when the SECURE Act was passed in December 2019. Another item from that list that seems unlikely to survive for the next decade is the Backdoor Roth Contribution – an unintended loophole resulting from a 2010 tax law change that allows some high income earners to circumvent the income limits for making Roth IRA contributions. As long as it exists, the backdoor Roth contribution is worth exploiting but just don’t expect the opportunity to last forever. 

9) There will be at least three market corrections (decline of more than 10%) over the next decade

The S&P 500 Index has experienced 27 market corrections since World War II – an average of one every 2.8 years. Given rich market valuations which bake in lofty expectations and allow less margin for error, it is not going out on a limb to forecast that we confront at least three market reversals of more than 10% each over the next ten years. Predicting when such corrections occur, how deep they go, and how long they last is decidedly a fool’s errand.

10) The six largest stocks (Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Tesla, Google, and Microsoft) underperform an equal weighted S&P 500 Index

These six tech companies represent nearly 24% of the S&P 500 – more than the combined value of 371 other stocks within the S&P 500. Such massive concentration is historically unusual and while this alone doesn’t necessarily portend bad news to come for the companies, it reflects the stock market’s already lofty expectations for their forward-looking growth. Historically, the largest stocks underperform after they get large for the same reasons that growth stocks historically underperform value stocks – including the tendency of investors to extrapolate recent growth and overestimate the persistence of such growth. In addition to the challenge of extremely high expectations, several of these companies also face the threat of antitrust regulation over the decade to come.

Measurement: Equal-weighted basket of these 6 stocks vs. S&P 500 Equal Weighted Index

The Opposition of Staying-the-Course and Doing Nothing

Barring any dramatic market swings in the final two weeks of 2020, we will experience the greatest calendar-year stock market recovery in history. On March 23, the S&P 500 was down 33.9% from where it started the year. As of December 14, the same index was up 13.5% in 2020 – representing a trough-to-peak gain of 64%. Chalk up another record for the year that is 2020.

There are plenty of lessons to be learned – or just to be reminded of – from this year. Among the valuable reminders is that doing nothing in the midst of sharp market losses (or gains) is negligent and irresponsible.

What’s that you say? You thought investment fiduciaries long preached a buy-and-hold approach that avoids market timing as the tried and true path to long-term financial success. Don’t such fiduciaries usually discourage market-timing? Did 2020 change that?

Nope. Still 100% advocates of a long-term, buy-and-hold approach. It is, however, requisite to understand that the long-term, buy-and-hold mantra is not a do-nothing strategy. It is a stay-the-course strategy. There’s a big difference between letting the wind take you wherever it will and readjusting the ship’s direction to maintain the targeted course. This is a fundamental but misunderstood concept of prudent buy-and-hold investing.

Consider that there are really three broad approaches to volatile markets:

1) Do nothing

2) Stay the course

3) Change the course

The change-the-course strategy is a market reaction strategy that historically has the worst results of the three. It is the equivalent of turning the ship around because of unexpectedly strong winds as if we did not anticipate that there would be difficult conditions along the way. Dignified investors who reduce risk in the midst of losses tend to label it as “going to cash until things settle down” or a more professional sounding theme like “market-based hedging”. Whatever it is called, 2020 produced another stain on the track record of the change-the-course strategy that sells stocks amidst market losses. And while 2020 was unique in a number of ways, it was not unique here. Four times during the past decade, the stock market suffered a drawdown of more than 15%. In all four of those instances, stocks quickly reversed and had fully recovered all losses within 138 trading days.

What about the do-nothing strategy? Consider the case of Rudolph in 2020. He started the year with 60% stocks (iShares All Country World Index ETF) and 40% bonds (Vanguard Total Bond Market) and did absolutely nothing – resulting in a 2020 gain of 10.8% (through December 14). Contrast this with Rudolph’s mentor, Vixen, who used rebalancing rules to apply a stay-the-course strategy to his investments. When the stock allocation departed the 60% target by more than 10% in either direction (54% / 66%), Vixen immediately rebalanced back to the 60% target. Employing this stay-the-course approach meant that he rebalanced investments on March 16 to buy stocks and on June 8 to pare back his stocks. Diligently setting the ship back to course during the choppy markets resulted in a return of 13.5%.

In sanguine times, there is little or no difference between staying-the-course and doing nothing. They are effectively one and the same. But when the stock market experiences a year’s worth of volatility in a few hours or posts several of the 20 most volatile days in stock market history as it did in March and April 2020, there is distinct opposition between staying the course and doing nothing.

Case in point: just 56 trading days into 2020 – and without any corrective rebalancing – Rudolph’s do-nothing portfolio that started as 60% stocks and 40% bonds became 50.6% stocks and 49.4% bonds. Whereas Rudolph started the year with 20% more in stocks than bonds, the two allocations were nearly equivalent by mid-March.

Lessons Learned from 2020

There are a lot of lessons to learn from 2020. But keeping to the topic of investing and market volatility, here are a handful of the fundamental takeaways:

  1. Staying the course does not mean doing nothing. When a target investment allocation is established, it will immediately deviate from target as the market moves. It is practical to let the allocation drift from target within reason. Letting the allocation drift materially off course as occurred for nearly all investors in 2020 without any correction (rebalancing) defeats the purpose of even having a target in the first place. It is the functional equivalent of setting sail from New York to London but letting the wind redirect you to Senegal without correcting course.
  2. 2020 provided a textbook case for the benefits of rebalancing. We covered a simple 60/40 example above but the results were similarly beneficial regardless of the targeted stock/bond allocation. The uniqueness of 2020 was that because of the dramatic intra-year volatility, the rebalancing benefits played out over a very short window of weeks rather than over years.
  3. One of the primary reasons that disciplined rebalancing works is because it contra-trades relative to human emotions. Rebalancing inherently reduces risk when risk premiums are low (fear is low) and adds risk when risk premiums are high (fear is high). The profits from rebalancing come from the bulk of individual investors who do the opposite – trade based on emotions (buying when perceived risk is low, selling when perceived risk is high) rather than trading based on a discipline.
  4. 2020 provided support of “tolerance band” rebalancing as optimal to calendar rebalancing. Tolerance band rebalancing is simply a disciplined approach like the one employed by Vixen where allocations are allowed to fluctuate within tolerance bands but when they “break the bands”, the allocations are rebalanced back to targets. Alternatively, calendar rebalancing tends to rebalance once a year on a preset schedule, regardless of intra-year volatility. In a year like 2020 where there is dramatic intra-year volatility, once-a-year calendar rebalancing often fails to extract the significant benefits of rebalancing. An investor who simply evaluates her portfolio every December would find roughly the same allocation in December 2019 as December 2020, losing out on the intra-year rebalancing premiums. While there are varying methods to apply Vixen’s tolerance band rebalancing approach, the evidence demonstrates that any reasonable form of his approach is optimal to calendar year rebalancing.
  5. Annual rebalancing is practical but suboptimal. For individual investors who do not have time to regularly monitor their allocations, calendar rebalancing is a reasonable balance between optimization and practicality. For advisors who charge a fee to monitor and manage portfolios, there is really no excuse in the Internet age to maintain a legacy calendar rebalancing approach in light of all the benefits of tolerance band rebalancing and the pervasive technology to perform it.

Have questions, comments, or general thoughts on the concepts above? Please use the comments section below to share.

The Best Mutual Funds – An Illusion of Hope Over Data

For the past 48 years, Forbes Magazine has annually published its Honor Roll – a “select list of time-tested, actively managed funds” that meet “demanding criteria”. This Honor Roll of recommended funds is expected – according to Forbes – to provide “meritorious after-tax performance over several market cycles.” Kiplinger Personal Finance Magazine has done something similar since 2004 – publishing the “Kiplinger 25” each year with its 25 favorite no-load mutual funds. Not to be left out, Money Magazine, annually produces its own list of the “Best Mutual Funds” – a “menu of high-quality funds that investors can use as building blocks in constructing a well-balanced portfolio.”

The intent is noble: provide individual investors with a selection of no-load, long-term-oriented, fee-conscious mutual funds for their portfolio. All three publications regularly highlight the importance of long-term investing. According to Kiplinger Personal Finance in the preface to their most recent Kiplinger 25 list: “We believe in holding funds rather than trading them, so we focus on promising mutual funds with solid long-term records.”

And while the intent of these recommended lists is honorable, they serve to reinforce the widely held and dramatically misleading concept that the past performance of actively managed mutual funds can provide useful prediction about future returns. To be clear- none of these publications select their recommended funds singularly by past performance. They each use different metrics including fees, consistency of strategy, and corporate culture but the choice of funds is distinctively driven by past performance. They all clearly cite historic performance as an important ingredient in their respective selection recipes. Furthermore, the removal of funds from these lists each year is generally decided by poor recent performance – further cementing the misleading value of historic performance. It is not a coincidence that the funds added to replace them – almost without exception – have strong recent performance at the time they are added. Such is the nature of these “best mutual fund” lists.

While these publications will often review the one-year performance of last year’s fund choices, there is no record that any of them ever review the longer-term performance of funds recommended several years ago. Or maybe they internally review the long-term results of their fund picks but recognize that publicizing the historic data would only serve to discredit their annual lists.

I thought it would be an interesting exercise to review the mutual fund picks from a decade ago and see how they did over the last ten years. Unfortunately, this exercise was more challenging than I anticipated. Possibly by design, nearly all of the decade-old mutual fund recommended lists have been expunged from the Internet.

Enter the magic of the Wayback Machine – a publicly available archive of nearly 500 billion web pages preserved over the past 25 years. Via the Wayback Machine and some crafty URL sleuthing, I was able to dig up several recommended lists from 2010. The findings and results from the 2010 lists are summarized below.

2010 Kiplinger 25 Best Mutual Funds

  • Of the 10 actively managed US large company funds that Kiplinger included on its select list in 2010, just one (10%) outperformed the index over the last ten years.
  • Of the 10 funds, one shut down halfway through the decade and three other recommended funds performed in the bottom 2% of all US large company funds over the past decade.
  • Over the past decade, an equally weighted portfolio of the 9 recommended funds that still exist (excluding the fund that closed; rebalanced annually) delivered a cumulative return of 138%. This may sound reasonably good until considering that the passive Vanguard Large Cap ETF produced a 260% cumulative return over the same time period.

2010 Forbes Honor Roll

  • Forbes named 10 mutual funds to its 2010 Honor Roll – a smattering of funds across different asset classes. Of the 9 actively managed funds on its recommended list, one closed down over the past decade due to unfavorable results.
  • Only one of the nine recommended funds outperformed its benchmark over the past decade. In fact, over a decade in which the S&P 500 returned 14.1% per year, this was the only fund on the Forbes Honor Roll to achieve a double-digit annualized return.
  • Unlike other lists, Forbes lists its funds in order of recommendation strength. The top fund in their list and the only A+ rated fund was CGM Focus. $10,000 invested in this top-rated fund on the list would have lost $179 over the past decade, declining to $9,821. That’s right – their highest rated fund lost money over a booming decade of growth. The same amount invested in the Vanguard Large Cap ETF over the 10-year period would have grown to $37,464.   
  • Assessing the 8 recommended active funds that lasted the full decade by a regression to determine whether they added or subtracted value (positive or negative “alpha”), only two of the eight funds added value (using the framework of a classic 3-factor Fama-French model).

2010 Money 70 Best Mutual Funds You Can Buy

  • Of the 10 actively managed domestic large cap mutual funds recommended in the “2010 Investor’s Guide”, 90% trailed the S&P 500 over the past decade.
  • Seven of the ten recommended funds lagged the S&P 500 by more than 2% per year over the past decade.
  • An equally weighted portfolio of the 10 funds, rebalanced annually, trailed the Vanguard Large Cap ETF by 2.3% per year.

Lying is More Profitable than Telling the Truth

The findings of this exercise are telling but unsurprising. And while the preceding may discredit the utility of the recommended fund lists, this is not in any way meant to discredit the good work of these personal finance publications. Kiplinger, Forbes, and Money all do excellent work and consistently provide valuable personal finance advice.

Here’s the point: past performance makes for a great marketing gimmick but an atrocious determinant of future performance. If you ever find yourself choosing mutual funds based on past performance or from a “recommended funds list” that uses past performance as a meaningful ingredient of the selection criteria, consider throwing darts at a printed page of low cost funds as an alternative and far better process. The reason? It is really, really difficult to differentiate luck from skill. Many funds will look really good or really bad based on past performance purely by chance. And separating luck from skill generally requires a much longer time period than we want to believe – not five or ten years of good returns but 70 or 80 years. Robust studies such as this one, this one, and this one have all reached the same conclusions: that it’s nearly impossible to separate luck from skill in investment funds, that we repeatedly confuse luck with skill, and that the tiniest fraction of investment products actually exhibit any evidence of skill.

Morningstar – a company that made its fame and riches on the star rankings of mutual funds – has on several occasions debunked its original star-rating methodology that relied on past performance. The research actually suggests that investors would be better off buying funds with poor recent performance and selling funds with good recent performance.  Such evidence provides further indictment about the utility of past performance as an indicator of future performance.

Sadly, the faith in hiring a team of human analysts, fund managers, or scouts to deliver a winning strategy is too deeply embedded to go away. Overconfident humans will forever search for the best mutual funds even if robust evidence highlights the folly of this exercise. Giving up on the quest would be an admission of failure. Personal finance publications will continue to provide “best mutual fund” lists because the public demands such – even if those recommended lists provide horrible long-term results. And the investment industry will likely never depart from the promotion of past performance because, regrettably, it is more profitable to lie to people who want to be lied to than to simply tell the truth.